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The Study In Brief
The push towards renewable energy sources has prompted major investments in mega-projects to generate hydroelectricity. However, government decisions to make such large investments in generating capacity must be scrutinized for economic soundness -particularly relative to the costs of alternatives for producing this power. Canada has several large hydroelectricity projects presently under construction including three that are the subject of this paper: Site C on the Peace River in northern British Columbia, Keeyask on the Nelson River in Manitoba, and Muskrat Falls on the Churchill River in Labrador. Each of these projects represents a multi-billion dollar upfront investment by public entities in long-lived generation capacity.
This study examines the cost-effectiveness of these hydro projects by comparing the costs of equivalent generation from carbon cost adjusted combined cycle natural gas turbines (CCGT). The analysis demonstrates that the levelized costs from the Site C and Keeyask projects may exceed the costs of alternative CCGT generation. The study notes that risks of building large generation capacity in anticipation of uncertain future demand for electricity and contends that, relative to large hydro projects, the roll-out of CCGT generation can be more flexibly timed (and paired with environmental initiatives) to meet demand as it materializes.
Even building-in the likely costs of cancellation, the author concludes that present economics would favour cancelling Site C and Keeyask and replacing the respective capacity with equivalent dispatchable CCGT generation capacity. The study shows that replacing Site C or Keeyask with equivalent CCGT capacity is cost effective even when applying a lower discount rate.
While an emphasis on renewables generation has motivated these major hydroelectric projects, the analysis shows that Site C exceeds the levelized cost of a CCGT alternative that faces a $50/tonne carbon price. Moreover, drawing from results in recent renewable energy procurement, the study observes that wind generation can provide a much lower levelized cost of zero-emission electricity than such large-scale hydro projects.
This study concludes by recommending that provinces re-examine the economics of these projects and consider cancelling projects which have more cost effective alternatives. To avoid uneconomic projects in the future, the report also recommends strengthening institutional independence -in particular, by ensuring independent regulatory review for mega-projects and leveraging greater private-sector discipline for the design and delivery of major electricity projects.
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We begin with an overview of the current status of three large hydro projects, then describe how sunk costs need to be a major factor in decisionmaking. This discussion is followed by an examination of the project-completion levelized cost of energy (LCOE) 1 vis-à-vis replacement with natural-gas fired resources. It also examines the case for project deferral due to delays in actual power needs. Finally, we address the common arguments of project proponents and make policy recommendations to prevent these costly mistakes.
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Se v er a l Potenti a lly Uneconomic Projects a r e Cur r ently under Construction
Three large-scale Canadian power-sector projects currently under construction stand out for their potentially poor economic prospects. These include the Site C project in British Columbia, the Keeyask project in Manitoba, and Muskrat Falls in Newfoundland and Labrador. Others under construction or proposed projects may face financial challenges as well. Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro load projections have deteriorated substantially since the project was approved in 2012. In that year, load expectations in 2020 were in excess of seven terawatt hours (TWh) but, as of May 2016, that level is not expected until 2036. 21 To date, termination costs have not been quantified. According to Nalcor CEO Stan Marshall, "the costs were so high, and the consequences so painful, that such an undertaking wasn't even worth" his time. 22 Concerned about the 16 "Project Overview." Nalcor Energy. 17 Nalcor Energy. Muskrat Falls Project Update. November 2017 . January 16, 2018 18 For fuller discussion, see Nalcor Energy. November 20, 2017. 24 While this Commentary focuses on comparing completion costs with the costs of gas turbines, imports and renewables with storage, the analysis should also take a broad view of variables, including demand response, energy efficiency and distributed energy resources, using an integrated resource-planning process. In the case of BC imports, while these may violate the "self-sufficiency" requirement of the province's Clean Energy Act, this self-imposed restriction could be amended. 
Sound decisionm a k ing depends on a proper under sta nding of sunk costs.
To determine whether to proceed with each of the aforementioned projects, the going-forward costs need to be compared on a levelized basis against alternatives. 24 Such an analysis, properly performed, requires ignoring expenditures to date, or sunk costs, that are irreversible. Policymakers often justify proceeding with uneconomic projects due to the significant amount of money that has already been spent. However, the decision whether to proceed with a project should be determined by the yetto-be-spent costs, instead of costs already spent. 25 Factoring sunk costs into decisionmaking results in a phenomenon known as the "sunk-cost fallacy." Politics make the decision to cancel (or defer) a project even more difficult as some politicians 25 Regulators in similar circumstances have allowed amortization of cancellation costs to avoid rate shock, and regulators who do not currently allow such practices should adjust them accordingly. The benefits of the cancellation accrue to future ratepayers in the same way that the costs would have, had it been built. perceive project terminations as an admission of failure. Alongside the funds spent, politicians invest their reputation and electability. BC Premier John Horgan has justified completing Site C by saying, "We will not ask British Columbians to take on $4 billion in debt with nothing in return for the people
Box 1: Exploring the Concept of Sunk Costs
A simple example, Investment A, may be helpful. Suppose someone has invested $100 and their cost of funds is 5 percent. Now, assume that they have been told that they can either abandon the investment and receive nothing, or they can invest an additional $100 and receive $2 per year in income in perpetuity. Clearly, to recover at least the cost of the incremental funds, the follow-on investment would need to yield $5 per year; the investor should decline to make any further investments in the venture and take the loss. of this province." 26 However, careful economic analysis suggests that BC ratepayers may, in fact, end up paying more by the project continuing than they would if they simply paid off the debt already incurred and pursued an alternative path. As we will see, continuing with construction on some of Canada's large-scale hydro projects may result in a similar loss of welfare for the ratepayers who will ultimately pay the bill.
Le v elized Costs for the Subject Projects a r e Dr i v en by Substa nti a l C a pita l costs
To determine whether the decision to continue construction is rational, we first calculated the LCOE for each of the three plants examined here based solely on so-called "go-forward" costs. We then compared these go-forward LCOEs to alternative approaches to meeting current needs, factoring in the cost of negative externalities. In addition to the go-forward costs, key assumptions for calculating the LCOE include the amortization period, the cost of capital, fixed and variable operating and maintenance costs, and expected annual production. While point estimates are provided below, they are tested against a range of possible outcomes in a subsequent section.
Go-forward capital costs:
These costs ( Figure 1 ) are based on recent announcements regarding amounts remaining to be spent on each of the projects, although it is likely that pressure for ongoing expenditure to create "facts on the ground" 26 "Government will complete Site C construction, will not burden taxpayers or BC Hydro customers with previous government's debt". BC Gov News. December 11, 2017. 27 This Commentary is based on the most recent data available at the time of drafting (May 2018). Due to the nature of this analysis, the economics of these projects improves as more capital is sunk. However, if we assume significant additional expenditure at Site C, our calculations suggest it would still be unfavourable. As noted previously, analysis using more recent data appears in the addendum. 28 BC Hydro issued a 61-year PPA to Capstone Infrastructure Corporation for its 16-MW Sechelt hydro project. See BC Hydro. Independent Power Producers (IPPs) currently supplying power to BC Hydro. November 2012. In Ontario, PPAs for hydroelectric power were signed for up to 50 years under its Hydroelectric Energy Supply Agreement procurement program. See IESO. Progress report on contracted supply. June 2015.
will make it more difficult to cancel the projects, the costs remaining are based on the most recent data available. 27 Assumed go-forward costs appear in Table 2 . We include the costs of transmission because of the location-constrained nature of these specific hydroelectric resources.
Amortization:
A key component of the LCOE is the length of the period over which capital costs are recovered. We have used a 60-year amortization period, which is consistent with the longest power purchase agreement (PPA) offered to hydroelectric independent power producers (IPP) in Canada. 28 While hydro assets are long lived, components require periodic maintenance and replacement, and experience suggests that parts of civil works may need to be replaced as well after several decades of use. 
Cost of capital:
A fundamental principle of corporate finance is that the cost of capital should reflect the risks of the project itself, rather than the generalized cost of funds available to the investor. Given that a substantial portion of the output of these three projects is earmarked for export markets with the risk of volatile prices, the cost of capital, in theory, could be as high as that for a merchant generator; i.e., one which has limited access to long-term PPAs as hedges. This position is partially offset by access to a domestic retail hedge provided by provincial load. Taking both these factors into account, we have assumed that the projects are financed using 70 percent debt at 4.08 percent 29 and 30 percent equity at 7.58 percent. The cost of debt was based on the yield of 30-year Canadian A-rated corporate bonds, while the cost of equity was calculated using the capital asset pricing model and based on Canadian power sector comparators. 30 We assume a tax rate of 0 percent, given that BC Hydro, Manitoba Hydro and Nalcor Energy are exempted from paying federal and provincial taxes. 31 The cost of capital was calculated as 5.13 percent. Details of the methodology are described in online Appendix 1.
29 It is not appropriate to use the cost of public debt as the basis for calculating the appropriate discount rate. The province is effectively investing on the behalf of taxpayers in an enterprise that is more risky than the province's sovereign debt.
Assuming 100-percent debt financing at the province's cost of funds would suggest that investing in a large-scale hydro project was no more risky than investing in sovereign debt, which is clearly not the case. For example, the Trans Mountain Pipeline project did not become less risky after it was acquired by the federal government, suggesting that assigning a lower cost of capital due to public ownership would be inappropriate in valuing it. 30 For the cost of debt, we took the average coupon rate of 30-year, A-rated corporate debt bonds issued by Canadian companies since January 1, 2017. 31 In lieu of federal and provincial income tax exemptions, the three Crown corporations make payments to provincial governments in the form of water rentals, capital taxes, debt-guarantee fees and other taxes or grants. In 2019, BC Hydro, Manitoba Hydro and Nalcor Energy are forecasted to make provincial payments of $433 million, $589 million and $8.2 million respectively. These amounts represent 12. Output: Assumptions for the output of each plant are shown in Figure 1 .
Results: Using the assumptions above, we developed a levelized cost for each of the plants, based solely on their go-forward costs. The outcome is as follows and is presented in more detail in online Appendix 2:
Site C: $100.41/MWh; Keeyask: $64.89/MWh; and Muskrat Falls: $59.25/MWh.
These projects a r e uneconomic by se v er a l metr ics

Replacement natural gas f ired capacity is cheaper
To explore whether the decision to continue construction on the three projects is in the public interest, we considered the costs of alternatives. First, we considered the levelized cost of building a combined cycle gas turbine ("CCGT") in each province. 34 In addition to the above key assumption categories, we also incorporated the cancellation costs of the current hydro projects, as well as natural gas plant costs and carbon costs. For comparison, we also delayed the in-service date of the replacement capacity to be consistent with identified needs, discounted to the present using the previously established cost of capital. Amortization: We used a 20-year capital recovery period for CCGTs. This is consistent with the capacity market assumptions of PJM and ISO New England, another regional transmission network. Furthermore, this time-frame is also consistent with North American experience regarding the average CCGT retirement age, which is 21 years. While our shorter assumed lifespan suggests earlier replacement than for a hydro station, we do not believe that the levelized replacement cost at that time would be significantly higher than that assumed for the first 20 years, given that technological improvements and existing site benefits can be expected to offset some of the impact of inflation.
Cost of capital:
We utilized the same capital structure and cost of capital for the CCGTs as for the hydro projects. 37 The projects would face the same counterparty risks, and while natural gas plants face commodity price risk, this risk is more hedgeable than hydrology. Output: For each province, we assumed that the CCGT was sized to match the output of the planned new hydro facility. 38 Because the CCGT has a higher capacity factor -assumed to be 85 percent in these calculations -than the hydro it replaces, the size of the facility in each province would differ. (See Table 3 .) 39 Both hydroelectric and gas-fired resources provide option value. Spinning gas reserves are arguably nearly as nimble as reservoir hydro in responding to changes in demand, whereas non-spinning resources will lag by the start-up time required. Overall, the marginal difference in option value is likely to be small. We also examine like-for-like capacity replacement if an equally sized CCGT were procured while maintaining the same expected level of output. This scenario overstates the levelized cost of CCGTs when matched for hydro capacity, as a CCGT could run at a higher capacity factor than that indicated if it simply matched the energy output of the hydro plant it replaces. Assuming a higher capacity factor would lower the overall 38 It is inappropriate to match the plants on an installed-capacity basis. The hydro facilities do not have excess capacity. The ability to dispatch at full capacity will be dependent upon the condition of their reservoirs, which will differ annually and seasonally. For the hydro comparators to receive full capacity credit, they will need to be able to deliver their full capacity at any time on short notice. In Alberta, the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) assumes dispatchable hydro has an unforced capacity capability of 81 percent of its installed capacity. This is also consistent with the approach taken by North American capacity markets that derate hydroelectric resources. 39 Incremental capacity can be procured more cheaply, and is of greater value closer to the location of need. In the case of BC, Site C's capacity could be replaced at much lower cost. 40 Site C and Muskrat Falls cancellation costs were amortized using an approved return on rate base of 3.47 percent and 6.82 percent, respectively. Keeyask's cancellation costs were discounted using the capital cost of 5 Waddington traded at a premium of $0.72. These differentials were applied to the levelized gas price and are provided in greater detail in online Appendix 4. In BC, an adder of $0.38 was included to account for the motor fuel tax. We assume that CCGT facilities connect directly to existing gas transmission networks.
Carbon costs: Carbon costs were added to the variable operating costs of the CCGT coming online in 2021, using the announced policies of the various provinces as described As discussed below, while we believe replacement with a CCGT could be delayed in BC, even if immediate construction were chosen, Site C should still be cancelled.
Del ays in need a llow costs to be defer r ed
Further analysis of CCGT deferral shows that Keeyask should be cancelled as well. The economics of cancellation are further enhanced when taking into account the ability to build replacements only as needed in sizes more consistent with need. In BC, Site C is not needed for domestic load until three years after current target completion, according to BC Hydro's low-load growth scenario. In Manitoba, Keeyask is not needed for 13 years after current target completion. 49 Muskrat Falls, however, may be too far advanced to cancel based on relative economics. Figure 2 shows the projected need dates and demand forecasts related to the three hydro projects.
48 Site C's completion could be justifiable under a carbon price of more than $100/tonne. However, higher carbon prices also make any of the more granular zero-emission resources a more economic choice. Results: Taking the projected need dates into account, we determined the discounted LCOE of a replacement CCGT for comparison purposes. We did this by projecting the LCOE of the replacement CCGT for the year of projected need, assuming construction commences three years in advance and then discounted that number to the present, using the CCGT discount rate. The outcomes for the energy replacement and capacity replacement scenarios are in Table 5 .
As Figure 3 below shows, when replacement of cancelled capacity is deferred, ratepayers receive greater benefit from cancelling both Site C and Keeyask, in both the energy and capacity-matched scenarios We emphasize again that the capacitymatched scenario overstates the LCOE, as lower capacity factors are assumed to match the expected output from the hydro projects. 50,51
It is important to emphasize the value of optionality, which comes with the ability to build in smaller unit sizes. The North American power sector is changing rapidly: demand is slowing or negative, behind the meter production and storage is gradually becoming more economic. At the same time, decentralized power grids are becoming more feasible. Large-scale, centralized, long leadtime investments like hydro stations run the risk of becoming stranded assets (assets which are no longer able to recover their costs) before they are even brought online, depending on the pace of technological change. Having the option to build something smaller and later means that provincial utilities can better tailor future investments to updated power sector dynamics, while being able to take advantage of intervening technological changes. Furthermore, the ability to spread these investments across the grid may enhance reliability and resiliency.
Ex a mination of sensiti v ities r einforces the conclusions
While it is important to recognize that each of the variables has a range of plausible outcomes, we believe that the best way to explore this span is to assess how the variables interact with one another.
To assess the sensitivity of assumptions to changes in combinations of key variables, we examined the outcomes using Monte Carlo analysis, a mathematical technique that generates random variables on the basis of a probability distribution to be used for modelling risk or uncertainty. Within determined input ranges, 1,000 trials were drawn following a normal distribution. For each trial, we compared the LCOEs of completing the hydro project to the LCOEs of deferred gas replacement combined with the levelized cost of cancellation. For all three projects, input ranges were determined for the weighted average capital cost (WACC), levelized gas price, carbon cost and remaining completion costs. The input ranges for each variable are as follows:
Figure 3: Comparison of Hydro and Deferred CCGT LCOE
• WACC: We tested values ranging from 4.13 percent to 6.13 percent within 100 basis points of the calculated WACC of 5.13 percent. LCOE comparisons in each trial apply the same WACC to both alternatives (project completion versus project replacement).
• Natural gas prices: In terms of the levelized gas price, we tested values ranging from $3.85/ MMBtu to $7.70/MMBtu based on the high and low-case EIA forecast from its 2018 AEO.
• Carbon costs: For carbon costs, we tested values ranging from $20 per tonne to $100 per tonne to include ranges from provincial and federal carbon pricing plans, and a significant margin.
• Completion costs:
We examined the impact of variation in the completion capital costs for the 52 "History of electricity." Canada Electricity Association. https://electricity.ca/learn/history-of-electricity/.
three hydro projects. We tested bounds of +10 percent and -5 percent for each project, resulting in a $8.1 billion to $ 9.4 billion range for Site C, $4.3 billion to $5.0 billion for Keeyask and $4.2 billion to $4.9 billion for Muskrat Falls.
As seen in Figure 5 , cancellation and deferred gas replacement was cheaper in 96 percent of Monte Carlo trials conducted for Site C, 61 percent of trials conducted for Keeyask and 0 percent of trials conducted for Muskrat Falls.
Pr ices in export m a r k ets a r e expected to be depr essed
Cross-border electricity flows between Canada and the US are almost as old as the North American electricity grid, with the opening of the first transmission line between the two countries in 1909. 52 These flows are taken for granted to such an extent that they are used to justify investment decisions in new hydroelectric facilities in Canada. However, North American power markets are evolving rapidly: load growth has fallen, cheap natural gas has reduced wholesale power prices substantially and targeted local renewables incentives have increased US power supplies. As a result, US export markets are likely to be significantly less lucrative in the future. 53 This is a function both of the depressed price of natural gas -which, as discussed above, is not expected 53 Declining export profits are evident today. BC Hydro's $643 million in 2016 gross electricity export revenues was its lowest in over a decade with an average price of $43.65/MWh. This contrasts with $2.29 billion in 2009 at an average price of $70.45/MWh. Manitoba Hydro earned $460 million in gross electricity export revenues in 2017, 61 percent of the $750 million earned in 2005. 54 Capacity prices are converted to $/MWh by dividing them by the total number of hours in a year. This process is necessary to allow for calculation of capacity revenues to resources that are assumed to be derated.
to increase dramatically over the forecast horizon -and of significant state (and expiring Federal) initiatives to encourage development of domestic large-scale renewable-energy assets. As Figure 6 shows, combined energy and capacity prices 54 in the target regions are expected to be below the levelized cost to complete Site C. While prices in export markets are expected to increase over the forecast period, they are not expected to reach historic levels. Essentially, this means that when exporting electricity, Canadian ratepayers will be subsidizing US consumption, rather than profiting from it. 55 Furthermore, Figure 5 assumes that new Canadian hydro facilities are granted full production-weighted capacity credit. But capacity is generally based on deliverability. Transmission deliverability needs to be available for the full amount of claimed capacity, performance penalties may apply and capacity credits may be derated. 56 Indeed, in the cases of Site C and Keeyask, adding the levelized cancellation costs to the export 55 This is already happening in Ontario, which has provided more than $57.5 million in benefits to US ratepayers since 2010 as a result of surplus baseload generation. See IESO. Hourly intertie schedule and flow data. 2010-2017; IESO. Hourly Ontario Energy Price data. 2010-2017. 56 While export contracts are in place to cover a portion of the output of the new projects, it is important to note that these contracts cover only a portion of the new projects' useful lives and could be profitably unwound by meeting the obligations with cheaper qualifying local replacement power. market price were sufficient transmission available, would make it cheaper (even accounting for transmission costs) for Canadian utilities to cancel the specified projects and import from the US. For example, adding Site C's cancellation cost of $14.06/MWh to the levelized price of energy and capacity from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is cheaper than the LCOE of finishing Site C until 2037. Importing allows for an even more granular approach to addressing future needs and, given the much larger market areas to which the provinces are linked, it offers a wide 
C a lifor ni a won't sav e us
In the case of Site C, some have argued that the unique characteristics of the California electricity market will help to justify its construction. In fact, the opposite may be true. Those unique aspects make it less likely that California will need energy or capacity from Site C. First, California policies targeting increased renewables have resulted in an oversupply of power over many hours of the day. Indeed, California's motivation for launching the Western Energy Imbalance Market is to export, not to import. In a presentation before the California Energy Commission, CAISO noted that the Western Energy Imbalance Market helped avoid curtailment of renewables, by 586,277 MWh as of the first quarter of 2018. 57,58 Second, as Figure  7 shows, California is aggressively contracting for in-state storage resources to balance existing and new renewables. Third, continued growth in behind-the-meter renewable energy resources and substantial energy-efficiency efforts have resulted in reduced load growth. Recent California Energy Commission projections for peak demand are increasing only 0.9 percent per year. 59 Furthermore, a review of relevant California dockets shows no meaningful reference to Site C. Taken together, these factors suggest that the California market may not be nearly as robust an export destination as BC planners would wish it to be.
Figure 7: Timeline of Energy Storage Procurements in California
Source: CEC. Tracking Progress -Energy storage. November 2017. also allows for technological improvements and cost reductions. In its 2017 report, the International Renewable Energy Agency predicted that the installed costs of battery storage systems could fall by 50 percent to 66 percent by 2030. 62 As such, the combination of wind and storage may be cheaper by the time it is actually needed.
Ther e a r e che a per ways to meet emissions goa ls
Limiting the role of independent regulators results in false expediency
In each of the three provinces, limited regulatory authority undermined reviews of their respective megaprojects. Large hydroelectric generation investments on the scale of Site C, Keeyask and Muskrat Falls, which amount to multi-billion dollar undertakings, must be vetted with corresponding due diligence.
Site C: British Columbia Utilities Commission
In British Columbia, the Utilities Commission Act ("UCA") gives the BC Utilities Commission Subsection 1 (Exempt projects, programs, contracts and expenditures) . 65 "Site C Dam will not be diverted to B.C. Utilities Commission" Alaska Highway News. 2015. <http://www. alaskahighwaynews.ca/site-c/site-c-dam-will-not-be-diverted-to-b-c-utilities-commission-1.2076979> Bennet maligns the capabilities and purpose of an independent regulator; massive public investment undertakings putting ratepayer money at risk need to be scrutinized outside of the political sphere by experts who can opine on need and alternatives in a fact-based process. 66 University of British Columbia. Regulatory Process for the Site C Project. May 2016. this provision, Site C was exempted from BCUC scrutiny under the province's Clean Energy Act. 64 Energy Minister Bill Bennett justified this decision stating: "The reason why we didn't send it to the BCUC is back when the Clean Energy Act was passed (2010), there was a decision made that if government was to build Site C, it would be a monumental decision in terms of energy policy that only duly elected officials have a right to make, as opposed to an organization like the BCUC that is made up of bureaucrats and lawyers." 65 But monumental projects are precisely those that require additional scrutiny. Instead, Site C was subject to a compressed nine-month long environmental assessment conducted by a large team reporting to a three-person Joint Review Panel. This panel recommended that the project be referred to the BCUC, but this did not occur. 66 BCUC's involvement came after the decision to go ahead was made. Construction began in 2015, whereas the BCUC review report was released in November 2017.
Muskrat Falls: Newfoundland and Labrador Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities
Under Newfoundland and Labrador's Public Utilities Act, RSNL-1990 : "A public utility shall not proceed with the construction, purchase or lease of improvements or additions to its property where (a) the cost of the construction or purchase is in excess of $50,000; or (b) the cost of the lease is in excess of $5,000 in a year of the lease, without the prior approval of the board." 67
Following an environmental assessment, the Lower Churchill Hydroelectric Generation Project was reviewed by a four-person Newfoundland and Labrador Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities panel to address whether the Muskrat Falls generation facility and the Labrador-Island Link transmission line represented the least-cost option for the supply of power to Island Interconnected customers over the 2011-2067 period when compared to the isolated Island development scenario. The review took place over a nine-month period; "[t]he Board's report on the Reference Question was initially required to be provided to the Minister of Natural Resources by December 30, 2011. This date was later extended to March 31, 2012 as a result of delays in receipt of critical documentation from Nalcor. This significantly impacted the Board's process and ability to answer the Reference Question as key procedural steps had to be changed or eliminated in order to meet the March 31, 2012 deadline." 68 Subsequently, the Newfoundland and Labrador Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities conducted a review of the Muskrat Falls project in 2012. In the proceeding's final report to government, the Board notes the woeful lack of due diligence regarding budget-impacting components of the project, stating: "There were gaps in Nalcor's information and analysis [in its decision to approve the development scenario and to commence detailed design], including: i) AC integration studies were not done; ii) probabilistic reliability studies to compare the two options were not done; iii) there is uncertainty with respect to adherence to NERC standards, and iv) the design return period for the HVDC overland transmission line is not in accordance with accepted standards and best practice." 69 The load forecast provided by Nalcor to the public utilities board was approximately two years old and was not updated during the review.
Keeyask: Manitoba Public Utilities Board
Under the Manitoba Crown Corporations Public Review and Accountability and Consequential Amendments Act, "No change in rates for services shall be made and no new rates for services shall be introduced without the approval of The Public Utilities Board." 70 No authority, explicit or implied, requiring the review and approval of capital expenditure is granted to the Manitoba Public Utilities Board (MPUB), but inclusion of such expenditure in rates is not guaranteed. However, the Manitoba government issued an Order-in-Council providing the MPUB with special authority to access information on Manitoba Hydro's financial health and capital expenditure plans during the 2017/18 General Rate Application process. 71
Wher e do w e go from her e?
It's Not Too Late to Reconsider
For projects like Site C and Keeyask, it is not too late to cancel. The sooner provinces face reality and begin negotiating reasonable cancellation programs, the better off ratepayers will be. Similar analyses may be applied to decisions like nuclear refurbishment. Provinces should consider hiring skilled negotiators to review all existing contracts and develop a pathway toward minimizing cancellation costs, identifying ways to recover value and exploring means of appropriately compensating key stakeholders such as First Nations. Given the lack of near term domestic need, provinces can focus on efficient project closure before exploring how best to meet long-term needs. However, the answer to that question almost certainly incorporates a portfolio of smaller-scale, shorter lead time, clean-resources dispersed geographically and temporally procured under a mix of ownership structures.
Institutional Independence Must be Strengthened
The nature of our parliamentary system means that governments with strong majorities can make quick changes to laws, restructuring regulatory institutions, changing their mandates, and enhancing or diminishing their powers. Regulators are often bypassed, meaning that large investment decisions can be undertaken based on the political whims of the moment. It is critical that Canadian provinces develop a commitment to well-resourced, independent and empowered regulators. Processes for review of large-scale publicly owned projects should not be ad hoc, nor should provinciallyowned entities be given a free pass from review. Commitments to independent review increase as past projects are shown to be uneconomic. However, memories fade, the lure of a new ribboncutting becomes too much and regulatory bodies are bypassed again. To the extent possible, a commitment to stronger, independent regulation should be embedded in legislation, along with a set of procedures that make it more difficult to circumvent that promise in future laws.
Greater private sector participation may increase discipline
Privatization is not a panacea; it needs to be accompanied by clear regulation and sound market rules. However, private sector involvement comes in a wide range of forms; indeed, Canada has been a leader in forms of inclusive privatization, which enable participation by pension funds, First Nations, and unions in the newly private entity. Large hydro sites could be auctioned or leased to private-public partnerships to improve price discovery and risk allocation, for example. In the Canadian context, where Crown corporations using ratepayer money become instruments of public policy, increasing private sector involvement can help prevent provinces from making costly mistakes.
Canadian provinces have significant capital locked up in mature industries in which private investment is common elsewhere in the world. Ironically, Canadian pension funds are among the leading investors in such assets outside of Canada. Provincial funds that are currently devoted to the utility sector can be recycled into activities where government investment provides a greater catalyst to growth and private investment is less available. Criticisms of recent privatizations, such as that of Hydro One, almost always miss the point that governments have funding constraints in other infrastructure areas that have higher social returns.
Even if the independence of Canadian regulatory institutions were strengthened, governments are notoriously bad at regulating themselves. Increasing private sector involvement in turn increases the independence of the regulator, because the regulator's rulings have greater consequencesshareholders losing money tend to put pressure on their boards to change their behaviour. Crown corporations losing money (or not making as much as they should) may be tolerated for a much longer period of time. Private entities would have been less likely to continue to greenlight further expenditures as cost overruns soared and market conditions deteriorated. Regulators would also have been better able to order reviews of imprudent investments by private utilities. For projects that cannot be cancelled, or are past the point of economically doing so, the respective provincial governments should at least explore the value that the private sector would put on the project going forward to determine whether any new risk-sharing arrangements are feasible.
Short-ter m pa in for long-ter m ga in
While the decision to cancel projects is politically difficult, clever regulatory accounting may enable more muted rate increases than those that have already been announced. For example, longer amortization of cancellation costs, coupled with avoidance of future costs, should enable demonstrable ratepayer benefits to be achieved. Provincial utilities sometimes point to current low rates as meaning that rate increases have limited impact. Yet those rate increases, when arising due to uneconomic choices, erode the competitive advantage of those provinces. This advantage is already under threat from lower US tax rates and falling US wholesale power prices as a result of low natural gas prices and substantial renewables production.
Cancelling uneconomic projects now is the right choice. Enshrining regulatory independence and private-sector participation will help shield ratepayers from future bad decisions.
Support the Institute
For more information on supporting the C.D. Howe Institute's vital policy work, through charitable giving or membership, please go to www.cdhowe.org or call 416-865-1904 . Learn more about the Institute's activities and how to make a donation at the same time. You will receive a tax receipt for your gift.
A R eputation for Independent, Nonpa rtisa n R ese a rch
The C.D. Howe Institute's reputation for independent, reasoned and relevant public policy research of the highest quality is its chief asset, and underpins the credibility and effectiveness of its work. Independence and nonpartisanship are core Institute values that inform its approach to research, guide the actions of its professional staff and limit the types of financial contributions that the Institute will accept.
For our full Independence and Nonpartisanship Policy go to www.cdhowe.org.
